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The basic goal of this Article is to determine the legal grounds, describe the 
current situation and try to establish the future of universalization of the Mine 
Ban Convention. First we set out to brieﬂ y explain the concept of universalization 
of a treaty in general and describe possible basic methods of its implementation. 
This is followed by the analysis of the text of the Convention, the ﬁ nal reports of 
the annual meetings of states parties and, more speciﬁ cally, the ﬁ nal report of the 
First Review Conference. In the section on the spread of the Ottawa Convention, we 
described its rapid entry into force and its unprecedented and far-reaching spread. 
In the closing section we present the methods available for further universalization 
of the Mine Ban Convention, attempting to foresee its future course.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic goal of this paper is to determine the legal grounds, describe the 
current situation and try to establish the future of the universalization of the 
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Con-
vention). To this end, we shall primarily try to brieﬂ y explain the concept of 
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the universalization of a treaty in general and describe possible basic methods 
for its implementation. In this we shall cast a look on the relation between 
international treaty law and international customary law, bearing speciﬁ cally 
in mind the different possibilities for the universalization of the Ottawa Con-
vention, as well as individual statements from the ﬁ nal reports of the meetings 
of states parties which, in our view, address this issue to a certain extent. 
This will be followed by a brief presentation of how the idea of a comprehen-
sive and total ban on anti-personnel mines started and its development from the 
beginning of the1990s until the adoption of the Ottawa Convention. After the 
analysis of the text of the Convention, the ﬁ nal reports of the annual meetings 
of states parties and, speciﬁ cally, the ﬁ nal report of the First Review Conference, 
we shall attempt to determine the legal grounds and the full meaning of the 
concept of universalization of the Ottawa Convention. Finally, in the section 
titled on the spread of the Ottawa Convention in time and space, we shall show 
the rapid entry of the Convention into force and its spreading quickly and far-
-reachingly, almost without precedent in the history of treaties. 
In the closing chapters we intend to present the methods available to states 
parties, the relevant organizations, and NGOs, for further universalization of 
this extremely interesting and in many ways special treaty, attempting to fore-
see the future course of the process on the basis of the actions taken by states 
parties and the response of states not parties. 
II. CONCEPT OF UNIVERSALIZATION
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, often referred to as 
the Mine Ban Convention or Treaty, is the most comprehensive international 
instrument dealing with anti-personnel landmines. By adopting a rather short 
(only 22 articles), but, in many ways remarkably progressive text, the States 
parties to the Convention agreed that never, under any circumstances, will 
they use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer anti-personnel 
mines. At the same time, they also agreed that they would never, under any 
circumstances, assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State party by the Convention1. Furthermore, States parties 
1 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-
-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Article 1.
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decided to destroy all anti-personnel mines in their stockpiles within four years 
after the entry into force of the Convention for a speciﬁ c State party, except 
for those anti-personnel mines retained for the development of and training 
in mine detection or mine clearance.2 Equally so, the States parties decided to 
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under their jurisdiction or control not later than ten years after entry into 
force of the Convention for a speciﬁ c State party.3 In addition, although not 
immediately clear from the title of the Convention, but immediately emerging 
in the mind of anyone that has been in any manner possible involved with 
the Convention, is the Convention’s provision regarding the assistance that 
States parties which are in a position to do so, should provide for the care, 
rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of the victims of anti-person-
nel mines.4 This represents a great novum in the history of international treaty 
law regulating disarmament and arms control since this is the ﬁ rst time that a 
treaty obligates the State parties to provide assistance to the very people that 
have fallen victim to the weapons prohibited by said treaty.5 
Let us now, after this short introduction on the Convention, turn to the 
main subject of our paper - universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.  
An integral part of any agreement under international law is the natural 
desire of its parties for the broadest possible application of the provisions of 
the respective agreement, that is - its universalization. This self-evident claim 
to universalization follows from the very logic of international law: like any 
law, it tends towards its possibly widest application. This tendency and logic 
may be explicitly expressed in the treaty itself, usually in its preamble, or they 
may not be mentioned at all, but nonetheless present. 
The reach of the implementation of a particular treaty (and by this we mean 
treaties open to accession by all the states of the world) is secured by the biggest 
possible number of states which in an appropriate manner, prescribed by the 
treaty, internationally express their readiness to be bound by its provisions, 
thus becoming parties to it. 
In addition to this formal treaty bind, there is a possibility for individual 
states, even though they are not parties to the particular treaty, to still imple-
2 Ibid., Article 4.
3 Ibid., Article 5.
4 Ibid., Article 6.
5 More information on the Mine Ban Convention and its history see below under Section 
“Brief history of the idea of a total and comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines”.
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ment its provisions, contributing beyond doubt to its universalization. For 
instance, individual states may simply declare that they will honor, or they 
may simply begin to de-facto honor, all or some of the treaty provisions even 
without formally acceding to the treaty. States may be caused to act in such a 
way by various practical and political reasons we shall not go into here. 
Another situation in which states are compelled to honor the provisions 
of a particular treaty even without being a party to the same, thus conﬁ rming 
its universality, is when a treaty is transposed from international treaty law to 
international customary law. Although such a case is an exception in the body 
of international law and usually requires a passage of a longer period, it is by 
no means unthinkable. 
It is useful to mention here the famous dispute submitted to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in 1967, related to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side and Denmark 
and the Netherlands on the other, better known as the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases. These cases prompted the Court to express very clearly and with 
far-reaching consequences its views on the issue of creation and validity of 
international customary law. In its judgment, rejecting the contention of Den-
mark and the Netherlands that the certain rule has become customary law, 
the Court, while enumerating the conditions which should be fulﬁ lled for the 
formation of the rule of customary law, established that “not only must the 
acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or 
be carried out in such a way, as to be evidenced of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”.6 
However, the relation between international treaty law and international 
customary law goes far beyond the limits of this paper, but we mention it in 
connection with the Ottawa Convention for two reasons. Firstly, in order to 
avoid a possible exchange of the “international or international humanita-
rian norm established by the Convention”, as noted in the ﬁ nal reports of 
the meeting of the states parties to the Ottawa Convention, for the norm of 
international customary law. Notably, it is quite certain that in regard to the 
Ottawa Convention there is (still) no international customary law which in 
this case would be binding on all the states of the world. Although it is beyond 
doubt that the entire international community, by adopting the Convention, 
witnessed the establishment of a new “humanitarian norm”, the relation of 
6 North See Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Rep. 1969.
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states not parties to the Convention does not meet two basic requirements for 
the Convention norm to be transposed to customary law as remarked above: 
states not parties do not systematically fulﬁ ll the obligations prescribed in the 
Convention nor is there in these states legal awareness of the need to implement 
its norms derived from international law. However, and this is the second reason 
why we included this relationship between international treaty and customary 
law into this paper, in reviewing possible ways to universalize the Convention, 
we did not want to leave out any possible, or in the foreseeable future rather 
probable, ways to spread this Convention.7 
Perhaps it is interesting in the context of the universalization of the Con-
vention to note the provision of its Art. 17 which explicitly prohibits expressing 
reservations to any provision of the Convention. This should by all means be 
considered a clear contribution of the creators of the Convention to its univer-
sal implementation, because this way it is a priori made impossible for states 
parties to limit or modify by unilateral declarations the obligations contained 
in the Convention in order to restrict the Convention in its content or spatial 
reach.
We shall conclude our addressing the general concept of universalization 
by noting that, today, when states have long ceased to be the only competent 
factors of international law and international relations, an important contri-
bution to the broad implementation of the provisions of individual treaties 
is also made by the relation of the so-called non-state actors to such treaties. 
Considering the growing signiﬁ cance of this topic in the Ottawa Convention, 
we shall be coming back to it later in this paper. 
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF A TOTAL AND 
COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
 
Basically, the idea of a ban on anti-personnel mines, as formulated in the 
Ottawa Convention, has from the very beginning included the idea of a total 
and comprehensive prohibition of this weapon. It is a big step forward com-
pared with the previous state of international treaty law under which the use 
of such mines was regulated in some detail and restricted in many ways, but 
7 Juraj Andrassy, Boæidar BakotiÊ, Budisav Vukas, International Law, I. dio, ©kolska knji-
ga, Zagreb, 1995. 
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not totally banned. In order to achieve the goal of total prohibition of anti-
-personnel mines it was, therefore, necessary to adopt appropriate new rules 
and ensure that all the countries of the world, in one way or another, accept 
adherence to the Convention. It was equally important that non-state actors, 
now almost the only users of anti-personnel mines, should waive their use, 
stockpiling, manufacturing, or transfer of this weapon. Today, we may say 
without exaggeration that states parties, relevant international organizations 
and NGOs involved have gone a long way on their path to the goal mentioned. 
Let us brieﬂ y summarize the history of the idea.
 Anti-personnel mines were ﬁ rst massively used in World War Two. However, 
the conﬂ ict itself was the one of such epic proportions, fought with horriﬁ c 
weapons and with so many casualties, that anti-humanitarian effects of anti-
-personnel mines were simply overlooked. However, further unlimited use of 
anti-personnel mines in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and subsequently in the 
ﬁ rst Gulf War, shockingly revealed the extremely inhumane and indiscriminate 
effects of this weapon. Such a situation provoked a coordinated action by a 
number of respectful NGOs, primarily the Human Rights Watch, the Handicap 
International, the Physicians for Human Rights and the Vietnam Veterans for 
America Foundation, which led to the creation of the renowned coordination 
of NGOs called International Campaign for the Ban on Land Mines8. From 
very early on in the history of the ICBL, NGOs uncompromisingly stepped in 
for a total ban on anti-personnel mines. At that time, an ever growing number 
of prominent individuals, including the UN Secretary General and presidents 
of the most inﬂ uential states of the world, like U.S. President Clinton, and 
religious leaders, e.g. Pope John Paul II, were joining the call for a total ban on 
this weapon. Nevertheless, the ofﬁ cial fora that should have logically led the 
discussion on this issue (primarily, the Conventional Weapons Convention, 
and the Conference on Disarmament) remained silent, incapable of reaching a 
8 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, better known under the acronym ICBL, 
was established in 1991 as a ﬂ exible network of non-governmental organizations with a 
basic common goal: a complete ban of anti-personnel mines. Besides the aforementioned 
goal, the member organizations of the ICBL, continue to work persistenly towards the 
implementation of the other goals established by the Convention, especially that of 
demining the territories under jurisdiction or control of the States Parties, as well as 
rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine survivors. The ICBL (which today numbers 
more than 1,400 NGOs from 90 countries), and its coordinator Jody Williams were 
awarded in 1997 the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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consensus on starting meaningful negotiations. This institutional crisis forced 
NGOs to press for a strong coordinated action which would soon lead to high 
awareness of danger from anti-personnel mines throughout the world, followed 
by the creation of an increasing number of new associations whose basic pur-
pose was to promote the idea of the ban on anti-personnel mines. They would 
encourage several states, particularly Belgium, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, 
Holland, Italy and some others to take unilateral measures directed, ﬁ rst at 
declaring a moratorium on the manufacture, transfer, stockpiling and using 
anti-personnel mines, as well as speciﬁ c action focused on destroying stockpiled 
anti-personnel mines, but also to ban anti-personnel mines altogether. Similarly, 
the massive pressure of the public and the awakened awareness of states of the 
need for an appropriate solution to this issue under international law led to 
the Ottawa Conference in 1996, attended by about ﬁ fty states, hundreds of 
NGOs and tens of UN agencies. The participants adopted a declaration on the 
soonest possible conclusion of a treaty to ban anti-personnel mines, followed by 
an ambitious plan to carry it out by December 1997. This is how the so-called 
Ottawa process was launched, ﬁ nally giving the issue of anti-personnel mines its 
full international legitimacy. The process continued with the ﬁ rst preparatory 
meeting in Vienna, where states discussed elements of the treaty for the ﬁ rst 
time, and the second preparatory meeting in Brussels, where states conﬁ rmed 
their readiness to agree on and sign the treaty. What followed is common 
knowledge: in September 1997, 121 states agreed and adopted the Convention 
on Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines in Oslo, and a few months later, on 4 
December 1997, the Convention was open for signature in Ottawa, which is 
how it got its colloquial name - the Ottawa Convention. On the occasion, the 
Convention was signed by 122 states. 
 This action of NGOs, with unprecedented results in the modern history of 
international law, some authors like to call “democratization of international 
law”, “international law from below” or “unconventional diplomacy”9. In any 
case, whether we attach the signiﬁ cance of a new force driving international 
law to the noticeable peculiarities in bringing about the Ottawa Convention or 
not, it is impossible to overlook the huge contribution of NGOs and particular 
9 See, for example, N. Short, The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban the Land-
mines, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, 1999. ili Julian Davis, The ICBL: Public 
Diplomacy, Middle Power Leadership and an Unconventional Negotiating Process, The 
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2004. 
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international organizations working tirelessly to create and have this Con-
vention adopted. Finally, the special character of this case is underlined by, in 
many ways, the exceptional position enjoyed by NGOs and some international 
organizations in the functioning and everyday implementation of the Ottawa 
Convention, formally introduced into the Convention itself. 
IV. ATTEMPT AT DEFINITION, AND LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE 
UNIVERSALIZATION OF THE OTTAWA CONVENTION 
 As we already pointed out, in a number of treaties it is possible to ﬁ nd 
explicit calls for their comprehensive implementation. By the same token, in 
the preamble to the Ottawa Convention, among the assumptions under which 
states parties conclude the treaty, there is also a call to the universalization of the 
Convention expressed in the following manner: “Emphasizing the desirability 
of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to 
work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant 
fora, including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, 
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects.”10 Though we shall try to explain the meaning of the quote in more 
detail in the section on the possible ways and applicable methods of further 
universalization of the Ottawa Convention, we may already point out that the 
states parties have taken this task very seriously and together with numerous 
NGOs and international organizations active in this ﬁ eld have undertaken 
adequate measures with a view to promoting the goals of the Convention as 
well as its comprehensive implementation. 
For further research into the universalization of the Ottawa Convention 
and its fullest possible deﬁ nition, it seems the most appropriate to use the 
designation states parties came up with to deﬁ ne this concept. The universali-
zation of the Ottawa Convention, as well as the Convention in its own right, 
may be seen as a permanent process managed by states parties i.e. by their 
formal and informal decisions ﬁ rst adopted at the meetings of states parties, 
10 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
-Personel Mines and on Their Destruction, NN-MU, no. 7/1998. 
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and subsequently through other mechanisms, which were gradually introduced 
with a view to more efﬁ cient functioning of the Convention. The concept of 
the universalization of the Convention, developing gradually through the ﬁ nal 
reports of the meetings of states parties and through informal discussions on this 
important issue, was thus assuming a more and more recognizable form. Univer-
salization reached its full physiognomy in the Final Report of the First Review 
Conference in Kenya in 2004.11 In the section dealing with the Overview of the 
Implementation and Status of the Convention there was a thorough analysis 
of all the key goals of the Convention, while the Action Plan, in its seventy 
points, set up clear objectives and the way to achieve them in the period until 
the next review conference. Accordingly, the Implementation Review included 
a comprehensive synthesis of the concept of universalization, as developed 
gradually by states parties at their meetings, and further development of their 
individual elements, whereas the Action Plan addressed the way and direction 
for the future action in this regard. 
Let us ﬁ rst see how states parties determined the concept of universalization 
of the Ottawa Convention in this most important document in its short, but 
rather intensive history: 
1. Primarily, universalization includes the effort to have states outside the 
Convention accede to it as soon as possible;
2. Universalization also includes the effort to have the states that signed the 
Convention ratify it as soon as possible;
3. It also includes, as a sort of an avant-garde outlook, the effort to have non-
-state actors observe the norms of the Convention; and ﬁ nally and origi-
nally, 
4. Universalization includes the recognition of the importance of public aware-
ness of the sense and signiﬁ cance of the Convention and the encouragement 
to its strengthening with a view to achieving its goals, one of which is, of 
course, its implementation. 
Let us go on to see what tasks states parties have set up for themselves until 
the next review conference in 2009: 
1. Further universalization of the Convention through appropriate argumen-
tation, primarily by emphasizing the very limited military efﬁ ciency of 
anti-personnel mines against their horrifying effects in humanitarian terms. 
11 Final Report, APLC/CONF/2004/5.
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In this, special attention is focused on the states which still continue to 
use, manufacture or possess huge stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, that 
is, on the regions where the number of states parties to the Convention is 
extremely low;
2.  Promotion of the goals of the Convention in bilateral talks, peace processes, 
national parliaments and the media;
3.  Promotion of the goals of the Convention in all the relevant multilateral 
fora; 
4.  Cooperation of all the relevant factors in the universalization of the Con-
vention, particularly the UN and its Secretary General, ICRC, ICBL, other 
NGOs, parliamentarians and concerned citizens;
5.  Acceptance of the norms of the Convention by non-state actors. 
The path to this comprehensive concept of the universalization of the Con-
vention was gradual. It is our intention to give a brief sketch of the development 
of the concept of universalization in the ﬁ nal reports of states parties, as well as 
its upgrade through informal convention mechanisms, particularly the activity 
of the Contact Group for the Universalization of the Convention. 
At the ﬁ rst meeting of states parties in Maputo in 1999, the concept of 
universalization was mainly determined in its traditional meaning, as in most 
treaties. This normally boils down to a general call on all the governments 
and people everywhere to join the states parties in their efforts, and a call on 
states not parties to accede to the Convention, on the signatories to ratify it, 
and on the states which for whatever reason are not able to accede to it, to 
provisionally implement its provisions. In the ﬁ nal report of this meeting12 
there is, however, a note of states parties concerning the establishment of a new 
international standard and norm of behavior with the entry into force of the 
Convention. Initially, we have tried to determine the relation between interna-
tional treaty law and international customary law, inter alia, to fully determine 
the meaning of this claim which, with some additions, continued to appear in 
the ﬁ nal reports of the meetings of states parties. We shall be returning to this 
important issue in further discussing particular parts of ﬁ nal reports. Although 
this is not mentioned in the ﬁ nal reports of the First Meeting of states parties, 
at the initiative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Canada set 
up a special Contact Group for the universalization of the Convention. The 
basic goal of the Contact Group was, and today still is, to encourage states 
12 Final Report/APLC/ MSP.1/1999/1.
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to accede to the Convention. Similarly, the Group expressed its readiness to 
render assistance, in particular cases when necessary and requested by the 
party in question, in the ratiﬁ cation or accession procedures. The activities of 
the Group and participation in its work are open to all the states particularly 
interested in further spreading the Convention. 
At the second meeting in Geneva in 2000, states parties underlined the 
need to continue to work on the universalization of the Convention, and they 
commended the work of a number of states, various international organizations 
and NGOs in this context. On this occasion states parties noted for the ﬁ rst time 
the importance of observing the provisions of the Convention by states parties 
themselves, attaching particular importance not only to the form but also to 
the content of the concept of universalization as well.13 Notably, the ultimate 
purpose of all the efforts directed at the universalization of the Convention is, 
actually, full and effective implementation of all its provisions. 
At the third meeting of states parties in Managua in 2001, the activities of 
the Universalization Contact Group were welcomed for the ﬁ rst time. Regio-
nal seminars in the areas with an extremely low number of states parties was 
supported. A recommendation to states parties was issued, whose importance 
will additionally grow in time, and it was repeated in the Presidential Action 
Plan14, urging states parties to particularly focus on the regions with the smallest 
number of states parties. This focus on such regions - it being clear they included 
the Middle East, Asia and the Community of Independent States of the former 
Soviet Union - reveals, three years into the implementation of the Convention, 
that it was already pretty much clear in which areas the Convention would 
require additional support. The initial enthusiasm in spreading the Convention 
that needed no particular nudging, although such an action started at the very 
beginning of the Convention, would be followed by the years in which sprea-
ding the Convention would greatly depend on the appropriate efforts of states 
parties. We shall be saying more about the speed and direction in which the 
Convention spread throughout the world, as well as about the regions where it 
was not accepted, in the section on “Speed and spatial reach of the spread of the 
Ottawa Convention.” In the Declaration from Managua15 there is a reiteration 
of the establishment of a new international norm (“we recognize that the new 
13 Final Report/APLC/ MSP.2/2000/1.
14 Final Report/APLC/MSP.3/2001/1.
15 APLC/MSP.3/2001/1.
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international norm established by the Convention is being demonstrated by 
the successful record of the implementation of the Convention, including the 
conduct of many States not party to the Convention respecting the provisions 
therein.”), introducing an important addition: the existence of this norm has 
been conﬁ rmed by the actions of many states not parties. Apparently, by special 
emphasis on de facto observation of the provisions of the Convention by states 
not parties, states parties tried to discreetly draw attention to the actions gra-
dually leading to the fulﬁ llment of the requirements necessary for the growth of 
the norm of international treaty law into the norm of customary international 
law, or at least to express their desire for such a development. However, this 
sentence, not even reinforced by the mentioned addition, cannot in any way be 
interpreted as a creation of a new customary law norm, but only as satisfaction 
expressed by states parties with the extremely successful implementation of 
the Convention and its quick universalization through both accession to the 
Convention and tacit acceptance of its provisions.
At the fourth meeting of states parties in Geneva in 2002,16 states parties 
mainly repeated their earlier, now already well-known, views and calls for 
the universalization of the Convention. What is special, however, about this 
meeting, and a characteristic that is becoming a distinctive feature of the 
Convention, is the call of states parties to non-states actors to commit to the 
waiver of the use of anti-personnel mines, in accordance with the norm set up 
by the Convention, with a view, as they said, to considerably speeding up the 
progress towards a mine-free world. This substantial extension of the traditional 
interpretation of the concept of universalization, taking it outside the circle of 
the usual actors, has been brought about by the increasing clarity of the view 
of states parties that contemporary users of anti-personnel mines are, in fact, 
non-state actors, and not governments. The activities of relevant international 
organizations and a number of NGOs, particularly the Geneva Call17, were 
16 Final Report, APLC/MSP.4/2002/1.
17 Geneva Call is an international humanitarian organization whose stated goal is to engage 
military non-state actors to adhearance to the norms of the international humanitarian 
law, begining with the Mine Ban Convention. For that purpose, Geneva Call introduced 
a new document, deposited with the Governmet of the Canton of Geneva, called “Deed 
of Commitment for Adherence to Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines and for Coopera-
tion in Mine Action”. This is an interesting and inovative way to oblige non-state actors 
to respect the Convention’s norms, to which they cannot accede, since only states can 
be parties to the Convention. 
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focused on raising the awareness of this extremely important fact, and was ﬁ rst 
recorded in the ﬁ nal report of a meeting of states parties. It could be said that 
this extension of the Ottawa Convention to non-state actors opened a new 
chapter in its universalization, as well as an important chapter in the history 
of international law. At the fourth meeting states parties also noted that the 
universalization of the Convention was prerequisite to the fulﬁ llment of all its 
humanitarian goals. It is absolutely clear that only a universal implementation 
of the ban on anti-personnel mines may lead to the ultimate humanitarian 
goal of the Convention: a world in which there will be no new victims of anti-
-personnel mines. At this meeting, states for the ﬁ rst time introduced univer-
salization among the core aims of the Convention, along with the protection 
of mine victims, mine clearance and destruction of stockpiles. This meeting 
again welcomed the efforts of the Contact Group towards the universalization 
of the Convention, particularly the establishment of the dialogue with military 
representatives with a view to disseminating knowledge about the Convention 
among military personnel, which - as noted - can play an important role in the 
decision of a particular state to accede to the Convention. Simultaneously, the 
meeting welcomed the efforts of the Group to put the universalization of the 
Convention on the agenda of individual regional organizations, particularly in 
low-response regions, as well as the effort to categorize states not parties by the 
reasons preventing them from accession. The report of the Standing Committee 
on General Status and Implementation of the Convention18 for the ﬁ rst time 
underlined the importance of consolidation of the international norm set up 
by the Convention and welcomed signiﬁ cant developments in this connection. 
Important novelties were also introduced in the President’s Action Programme, 
which emphasized the need to include in the Convention, as soon as possible, 
the biggest manufacturers, owners and users of anti-personnel mines. This 
particularly underscored the belief of states parties that the ostensible military 
beneﬁ ts of anti-personnel mines, proved wrong on several occasions, can in no 
way outweigh the devastating humanitarian consequences of this weapon, or 
justify it. It is precisely this argument that states parties are determined to use 
in their talks with those who are still not sure whether it is justiﬁ ed for them 
to accede to the Ottawa Convention. 
At the fourth meeting, states parties introduced another important novelty 
in the language concerning the universalization of the Convention: the con-
18 APLC/MSP.4/2002/SC.4/1/Rev.1. 
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cept of the “role of public conscience”. States parties noted that the efforts of 
ICBL, ICRC and others throughout the world were evidence of the important 
role of public conscience in resolving the problems of anti-personnel mines, 
particularly in maintaining the interest within states and, consequently, the 
appropriate international settlement of the problem. It is undisputable that it 
was this incentive focused on maintaining the interest in achieving the goals 
of the Convention that was prerequisite to its further spread. In this context 
there was a special emphasis on the exceptional cooperation and partnership 
among states parties and NGOs, ICBL, ICRC, UN, regional organizations and 
others in achieving the goals of the Convention. 
 I would also like to mention that in the ﬁ nal report of the meeting a 
number of states parties from Latin America added their call from Managua19 
expressing their desire to establish a zone free of anti-personnel mines in the 
western hemisphere. Similarly, partner states and observers of the Human Se-
curity Network enclosed with the ﬁ nal report their declaration on the promotion 
of the universalization of the Convention, in which they particularly commend 
efforts of individual states in this regard. 
At the ﬁ fth meeting in Bangkok, states parties reiterated most of the above-
mentioned views on the universalization of the Convention and particularly 
underlined that it was the ﬁ rst gathering of states parties in Asia, which was 
a signiﬁ cant step in the direction of spreading the Convention in that region. 
They also called on the signatories to the Convention to honor their commit-
ments and not to act in contravention of the goal and purpose of this treaty. 
They particularly emphasized the beneﬁ ts which mine-infested developing 
states could enjoy if they accede to the Convention, particularly stressing as-
sistance to the victims and support in mine clearance. States parties thereby 
once again reafﬁ rmed their often repeated belief that anti-mine assistance needs 
to primarily focus on states parties to the Convention. Interestingly, the ﬁ nal 
report of the meeting calls on non-state actors to cease to use anti-personnel 
mines in accordance with the principles and norms of international humani-
tarian law. We must confess that in our opinion, international humanitarian 
law, while bringing a number of rules on the methods and means of warfare 
to be adhered to by the parties to a conﬂ ict, does not prohibit the use of anti-
-personnel mines either by states or by non-state actors. In this connection we 
hold it more appropriate to indicate in this report to the new rules set up by 
19 APLC/MSP.4/2002/1.
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the Convention and call on non-state actors to respect them, as had been done 
in the ﬁ nal report of the preceding meeting of states parties. In the ﬁ nal report 
of this meeting20 particular attention was paid to the cooperation between go-
vernments, international organizations and NGOs, focused on strengthening 
their strategic partnership with the media and the private sector with a view 
to forming public opinion to further universalize the Convention. Welcome 
partners in achieving this goal are particularly parliamentarians, the Human 
Security Network, certain multilateral fora such as Non-aligned movement, 
interparliamentarian unions and other regional organizations. The explicit men-
tion of the non-aligned countries movement in this document clearly indicates 
the attempt of states parties to use the most inﬂ uential fora in the part of the 
world where the implementation of the Convention lags behind. 
It is also noteworthy that numerous states have from the very beginning 
of the Ottawa process paid great attention precisely to the media. Thus, presi-
dents of the meetings of states parties usually gave a press conference before, 
during and after the meetings of states parties and extensively reported to the 
media about their work between the meetings of states parties, in Geneva and 
in other important centers, as well as in the cities where the meetings took 
place. In such conferences, they were joined by representatives of civil society, 
led by the ICBL, or ICBL organized its own press conferences. States parties, 
nudged by civil society, very soon realized that it was through the efforts to 
raise the awareness of the world at large and of each individual via the media, 
concerning the existence and the contents of the Ottawa Convention, that the 
consistent implementation of the Convention greatly depended. States parties, 
owing also to tiresome media action primarily of ICBL and ICRC, as well as 
of other relevant organizations, really came closer to the ultimate goal of this 
undertaking. In regard to the work of the Universalization Contact Group, 
states parties stressed the special role of partners in the joint action towards 
universalization, explicitly mentioning parliamentarians, ICBL, ICRC, parti-
cular international organizations, the Non-aligned Movement and particular 
regional organizations. Lastly, the ﬁ nal report from Bangkok was also added 
the Lima Declaration21 in which experts from American states parties reiterate 
the “importance of adhering to the principles and fulﬁ lling the obligations esta-
blished by international law with regard to the action against anti-personnel 
20 Final Report, APLC/MSP.5/2003/5. 
21 APLC/MSP.5/2003/5.
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mines, which are in force for all the nations.” In this regard, we have to stress 
once again, that in our opinion neither the rules of international customary 
law nor the speciﬁ c rules of international humanitarian law prohibit the use of 
anti-personnel mines. These rules do contain principles according to which it 
is not permitted to use a weapon with indiscriminate and extremely inhuman 
effects. They also introduce the necessary distinction between military and 
civilian targets in military operations, and provide that the injury inﬂ icted 
should be in proportion with the aims of the military operation. However, 
the elaboration of these principles is not always simple and frequently leads 
to different interpretations by states. In that regard it is impossible to ﬁ nd a 
common position of the states on the issue of anti-personnel mines, espeecially 
not the agreement on the ban on their use. Had there been an agreement on 
the impermissibility of anti-personnel mines for the above-mentioned reasons, 
the Ottawa Convention would have been redundant, as well as the treaties 
preceding it in this regard. The most that can be claimed to be contained in 
international customary law concerning mines, both anti-vehicle and anti-per-
sonnel, and their use in international or internal conﬂ icts, is that, as a general 
principle, in using them particular attention is to be paid to reducing to the 
minimum their indiscriminate effects.22 Regrettably, it has to be admitted 
that the practice of some states (use, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of 
anti-personnel mines), on the one hand, and the lack of clear understanding 
on the meaning and application of the adequate principles of international 
humanitarian law, on the other hand, precludes the creation of international 
customary law in this regard. 
The sixth meeting of states parties in Zagreb was special in many ways. The 
basic task of states parties at this meeting was to support the implementation 
of the Action Plan from Nairobi through the assessment of the progress in the 
implementation of its guidelines, and to determine the course of action for 
the next year. In this context the ﬁ nal report from Zagreb, the so-called Zagreb 
Progress Report23, is actually a detailed overview of the activities established 
by the Action Plan and undertaken within each of the areas of implementation 
of the Convention, including its universalization. In addition, states parties set 
up their priorities for the implementation of the Action Plan for the next year. 
22 Jean Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law, Volume I: Rules, Cambridge, 2005. 
23 APLC/MSP.6/2005/5.
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Thus in regard to the universalization of the Convention states parties decided 
to focus their activities on the states which announced they might ratify the 
Convention or accede to it in the near future, and on the states which use, 
manufacture or massively stockpile this type of weapon. Finally, states parties 
have expressed their determination to promote the general implementation of 
the provisions of the Convention by undertaking appropriate measures for the 
termination of the use, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines by non-state actors. 
At the seventh meeting of states parties24 in Geneva, the task of states parties 
was identical to the one in Zagreb: to evaluate the implementation of the Ac-
tion Plan from Nairobi and to determine the priorities for the next year. States 
parties did just that, bringing among other things, a detailed overview of the 
state of the universalization of the Convention and the measures undertaken. 
We shall be saying more about the status established and the future measures 
in the chapter on the “Methods and the Future of the Ottawa Convention”. 
  
V. SPEED AND SPATIAL REACH OF THE SPREAD OF THE 
OTTAWA CONVENTION
In this chapter we shall try to present the really impressive manner in which 
the Ottawa Convention entered the international scene and immediately began 
to spread throughout the world. 
The attention of the ﬁ nal reports and presidential declarations we have 
discussed will now be drawn to facts from the ﬁ eld. In their ﬁ nal reports states 
parties wanted, in a way, to create the reality. Final reports of states parties, 
however, often depended on - and, indeed, reﬂ ected - the implementation of 
the Ottawa Convention in the ﬁ eld. This healthy focus of states parties on 
hard facts, not only on the proclaimed ideals, is another extremely important 
contribution of NGOs to the Ottawa Process. Particularly in this context it 
is necessary to mention the huge - both in importance and volume - edition 
24 The Final document from this meeting has not been issued yet, but an informal ver-
sion can be found at the web site of the GICHD. All previousely mentioned documents 
adopted at the meetings of the states parties can also be obtained at this web site. The 
address is www.gichd.ch. 
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of the ICBL: Landmine Monitor25, through which civil society conﬁ rms its 
commitment to the implementation of the goals of the Ottawa Convention 
and their supervision. In this manual with more than 1,200 pages there is a 
detailed overview of the implementation of the Convention in the last year, 
by individual key areas and by individual states parties, simultaneously noting 
the progress achieved, without unnecessary circumlocution, and identifying 
the remaining problems. Consequently, in this introduction to the description 
of the “explosion” of the Convention in terms of time and spatial reach, we 
can but join the newest issue of Landmine Monitor26 in concluding that the 
only real measure of the success of the Convention is its palpable effect on the 
extremely grave problem caused by anti-personnel mines. 
 Soon after the signature of the Convention in Ottawa27, the Secretary 
General of the United Nations began receiving numerous documents of ratiﬁ -
cation, acceptance or approval of the Convention. About ﬁ fteen months after 
the signature of the Convention, on 1 March 1999, the requirement referred 
to in its Article 17 was met and the Convention came into force “on the ﬁ rst 
day of the sixth month following the month in which the fortieth document 
of its ratiﬁ cation, acceptance or approval has been deposited.” This rather 
common phrase related to the entry into force of treaties is only mentioned 
to point to the fact that the ﬁ rst forty documents of ratiﬁ cation, acceptance 
or approval of the Convention were collected in about nine months, that is 
between December 1997 and September 1998! When we compare this with the 
usual period of time that passes between the signature of a treaty and its entry 
into force - bearing in mind that a number of treaties actually required much 
less ratiﬁ cations for them to enter into force than is the case with the Ottawa 
Convention, this result is truly amazing. Besides, in less than two years after 
being open for signature, almost half the states of the world became parties to 
the Convention! It could almost be said that in regard to the speed with which 
25 The eighth, and last Landmine Monitor Report, was presented to the public in mid 
September 2006, simultaneously in thirty-odd towns and cities, with requisite media 
coverage. This annual presentation of the ICBL, also represents an important contribu-
tion to the broader media presentation of the Mine Ban Convention and the problem of 
anti-personnel mines discussed in this Article. 
26 Landmine Monitor, July 2006. In this part of the article we will draw heavily from upon 
the data presented in this year’s edition of the Landmine Monitor. 
27 Between December 3, 1997, when the Convetnion was opened for signature and its 
entry into force on March 1, 1999, 133 states signed on to the Mine Ban Convention.
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the Convention entered into force, at least compared with major treaties in 
this area, this was without precedent. 
 As regards the geographic distribution of the interest of states in the Con-
vention, among the states which - with their appropriate actions - enabled 
the Convention to enter into force there were about twenty European states, 
among others France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and Croatia. 
In addition, about a dozen African, a dozen American-Caribbean, and some 
Paciﬁ c states deposited their appropriate ratiﬁ cation instruments before the 
Convention entered into force. Regrettably, the states of Asia and the Middle 
East did not show any interest whatsoever in the Convention from its very 
beginning. The only exception in the Middle East was Yemen. The trend noted 
before the Convention entered into force was to a great extent continued after 
the Convention entered into force. Thus, in 1999 for example, the Convention 
was acceded to by ten European states, ten Latin-American states and six African 
states. That year, the Convention was also acceded to by Australia and New 
Zealand. The response in Asia, where the Convention, in 1999, was acceded 
to by Malaysia, Tajikistan and Cambodia, and in the Middle East where not a 
single state acceded to the Convention, remained extremely weak. In 2000, the 
process of mass accession to the Convention continued, particularly in Africa 
where the Convention was acceded to by another dozen states. In Europe the 
universalization continued by the accession of Albania, Romania and Molda-
via. The acceptance of the Convention in the Americas and in the Caribbean 
and Paciﬁ c areas, excluding some of the smallest states in this region for which 
the procedural issues related to the accession were too great an administrative 
burden, was almost absolute. The next two years, 2001 and 2002, marked the 
completion of the process of universalization in Africa, with another ﬁ fteen 
countries acceding to the Convention. Thus, almost all the African states ac-
cepted the Convention. Today, in addition to Somalia which under the circu-
mstances of a transitional government, nevertheless, announced its accession 
to the Convention in the nearest future, the only African countries which are 
not parties to the Convention are Morocco, Libya and Egypt. A year later, in 
2003, the Convention was acceded to by another ﬁ ve European states, among 
which, simultaneously and on the basis of mutual agreement, were Greece and 
Turkey, which is considered an exceptional success in the universalization of the 
Convention and a direct consequence of tireless activity of states parties and the 
relevant organizations and NGOs. This way the process of the universalization 
of the Convention was completed in Southeast Europe, and the Convention 
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included almost entire Europe. That year, the Convention was acceded to by 
Cyprus, in a way the one and only state of the Middle East that has done so. 
From 2003 to 2006, each year the Convention was acceded to by one Asian 
state in the following order: East Timor, Bhutan and Brunei Darussalam. The 
number of states parties thus rose to about ten, which is still a very modest 
result, bearing in mind the scale of the problem caused by anti-personnel mines 
in that part of the world, and the fact that the states mentioned, except for a 
few, do not include the most important states of the continent. 
 After the sweeping start of the Convention, there necessarily followed 
slowing down of the trend caused by the reduction in the number of states 
remaining outside the Convention, as well as by real or ﬁ ctitious problems 
which some states used as a pretext for not acceding to the Convention. Thus, 
for example, a number of states explain their non-accession by an important 
position the weapon at issue occupies in their national military strategy (USA, 
South Korea, Cuba etc.), or by special defense arrangements with states not 
parties (Palau). Other states claimed that their accession was postponed until 
the ﬁ nal resolution of their ongoing territorial, regional or internal disputes 
(Armenia and Azerbaijan). Still other states claimed that they were prevented 
from the accession to the Convention by the use of anti-personnel mines by 
non-state actors in their territory. Some cannot accede to the Convention simply 
because the procedure involved requires administrative activity which under 
the circumstances of reduced capacities and scarce resources cannot count as 
priority (some of the smallest Paciﬁ c states, e.g. Tuvalu and Tonga), and some 
simply cannot accede to the Convention because of the lasting political uncer-
tainty and absence of stable government (Somalia). 
 Particular attention of states parties to the Convention is drawn to the states 
which signed the Convention but have still not ratiﬁ ed it - Poland, Indonesia 
and the Marshall Islands. However, Indonesia and Poland announced their 
readiness to ratify the Convention soon and initiated their respective national 
procedures to this end, whereas the Marshall Islands voted last year, for the 
ﬁ rst time, in favor of the resolution of the UN General Assembly calling for 
the universalization and full implementation of the Ottawa Convention, after 
having regularly abstained from voting in the preceding years. 
 Consequently, the states parties of today include almost entire Europe, with 
the exclusion of Finland and Poland, the entire western hemisphere, that is all 
the American states, with the exclusion of Cuba and the USA, and all the African 
states, except the four above-mentioned states. Outside the Convention there 
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still remain most states of Asia, the Middle East, and CIS countries, totaling 
about 20% of the states of the world, or 44 to be exact. 
 Finally, let us brieﬂ y mention here the interesting case which emerged from 
the dissolution of the state of Serbia and Montenegro. After the referendum on 
independence was held on 21 May this year, and Montenegro proclaimed its 
independence, on 3 June, Serbia, according to Article 60 of the Constitutional 
Charter on which the State Union was based, has automatically become legal 
successor of the previous State. It means that Serbia continues legal perso-
nality of that state as well as its status in the international organisations and 
treaties to which the former state was a party. Accordingly, Serbia has become 
a state party to the Mine Ban Treaty while Montenegro had to accede to it. By 
depositing its instrument of accession to the Convention with the Secretary 
General on 23 October 2006, Montenegro fulﬁ lled this requirement and has 
become the 152nd State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. 
VI. METHODS AND THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSALIZATION OF 
THE OTTAWA CONVENTION 
We shall now say something about the methods which states parties and 
relevant organizations and NGOs developed for the universalization of the 
Convention and the plans for the future activities to this end. As can be seen 
from this paper, a special role in planning and developing the strategy for the 
universalization of the Convention is played by the Universalization Contact 
Group. This group holds its meetings on the margins of formal and informal 
meetings of states parties where, led by an experienced Canadian team, it 
evaluates the performance in this respect and further determines priorities. At 
the latest meeting in Geneva, at the margins of the Seventh Meeting of states 
parties, states not parties have been categorized, in accordance with the goals 
set, into ﬁ ve groups, and for each state within a group a review of the results 
achieved has been published, as well as the actions to be taken in the next 
period. In addition, the time period in which the actions mentioned should 
bear fruits has also been determined. 
The ﬁ rst group includes states which, given proper incentive, could accede 
to the Convention or ratify it by the next, the eighth, meeting of states parties 
to be held in Jordan from 18 to 22 December 2007. These states are: Kuwait, 
Micronesia, Palau, Poland, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. The next 
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group includes states which could accede to the Convention by the ninth 
meeting of states parties. They are: Bahrain, Oman and Lebanon. The next 
group includes states whose relation towards the Convention does not allow for 
planning an exact date of their accession to the Convention but rather opens 
a possibility to implement “provisional measures” aimed at their inclusion in 
the work of formal and informal meetings of states parties, or a hint at possible 
accession to the Convention. They are: Finland, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Laos, 
Mongolia, Somalia, and the Paciﬁ c islands of Tonga and Tuvalu (note that the 
Department for Support of the Ottawa Convention, an important mechanism 
set up by states parties for the most effective possible implementation of the 
Convention, offered these states - within the framework of a special policy 
towards small island states - support in respect of the process of ratiﬁ cation of 
or accession to the Convention). The fourth group includes states which have 
declared support for the Convention or an interest in it and which are to be 
persuaded that it is necessary for them to take further steps in this direction. 
They are: China, Israel, Morocco, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan. Finally, 
the ﬁ fth group includes states which need to be persuaded that their atten-
ding meetings of states parties would be meaningful. They are: Georgia, India, 
Pakistan, Singapore and Vietnam. 
It is easy to note that this list does not include all the 44 states which are 
not parties to the Convention. Particularly striking is the absence of the USA, 
as well as of Cuba, Iran, Egypt, Syria, both Koreas, and Russia. The fact that 
a small number of individual states are not on the list means that these are 
the most difﬁ cult cases for the universalization, where it is estimated that no 
efforts will currently bring any positive results. Particularly worrying in this is 
the fact that these states include some of the biggest users, manufacturers and 
stockpilers of anti-personnel mines, some of which have announced research 
and development of new landmine systems between 2005 and 2011 that are 
incompatible with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention. However, it should 
be mentioned that a number of NGOs, led by ICBL, continue their tireless 
efforts, supported by civil society in a number of aforementioned countries, 
aimed at introducing a change in stands of political elites towards this impor-
tant issue. 
Most of the measures to be undertaken in connection with encouraging the 
above-mentioned groups of states with a view to achieving the universalization 
goals are mainly applicable to all the groups, whereas a few ones are applicable 
to individual groups. The measures are a result of many years of efforts invested 
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by the Universalization Contact Group to develop appropriate methods and 
ways for further spread of the Convention. These measures primarily include: 
maintaining contacts with possible delegations of targeted states at next infor-
mal and formal meetings of states parties, encouragement to submit voluntary 
reports in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention, stronger pressure of 
states parties in a particular region on their neighbors, activities of the Imple-
mentation Support Unit aimed at facilitating the creation of formal condition 
related to drawing up and submitting the ratiﬁ cation instrument, sending 
topical letters and appropriate demarches, sending letters from donor states to 
highlight the beneﬁ ts enjoyed by states parties following their accession to the 
Convention, organization of seminars on the implementation of the Ottawa 
Convention or treaties in general, as well as of seminars on speciﬁ c technical 
questions concerning the Convention, visits of representatives of ICBL, ICRC 
and other relevant organizations, as well as activities of regional delegations 
of the ICRC or national Red Cross societies or Red Crescent societies, and 
permanent monitoring of the developments related to the Convention in any 
individual state by the civil society with appropriate international support.
Finally, the aforementioned categorization of states makes further direction 
and speed of the spread of the Convention clearly predictable. Apparently, 
no spectacular developments are to be expected in the universalization of 
the Convention any more, but rather a stable addition of several states per 
year. States parties, relevant organizations and NGOs can only persevere in 
working together until the total universalization of the Convention, because it 
is precisely universalization of the Convention that is the sole guarantee that 
signiﬁ cant developments in disarmament and humanitarian goals achieved 
to date will survive, and that a world free of anti-personnel mines will ﬁ nally 
become reality28. 
VII. CONCLUSION
 As we have tried to show in this paper, the Ottawa Convention is in many 
ways an exceptional treaty. However, what really distinguishes it from all the 
other major treaties, and what gives it a lasting mark, is the cooperation between 
governments and civil society that is without precedent. Civil society played 
28 Final Report, APLC/CONF/2004/5.
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an extremely important role not only in the creation of the Convention, but 
also in the implementation of its fundamental goals and its supervision. The 
universalization of the Convention, which is surely one of the basic objectives 
of the Convention, is perhaps the best example of this cooperation. Owing to 
this cooperation, the Convention currently includes almost all European, Ame-
rican and African states. They also include two members of the UN Security 
Council and states with substantial military and political capabilities. A direct 
consequence of the universalization of the Convention, of course, has meant 
great achievements in all the fundamental areas of the implementation of the 
Convention. Primarily, the use of anti-personnel mines has been stigmatized 
throughout the world and very few governments use this weapon (last year 
anti-personnel mines were only used by Russia, Myanmar and Nepal). In ad-
dition, the number of non-state actors using anti-personnel mines is constan-
tly falling. Last year, non-state actors used anti-personnel mines in about ten 
countries, whereas a signiﬁ cant number of them (29) declared their readiness 
to waive the use of anti-personnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment of 
the Geneva Call, issuing unilateral declarations to such an effect, or through 
bilateral agreements between the parties to conﬂ icts. Of about ﬁ fty states which 
manufactured anti-personnel mines before the entry of the Convention into 
force, 38 have terminated the manufacture, including ﬁ ve states which are not 
parties to the Convention. The transfer of anti-personnel mines has been com-
pletely stopped, that is, reduced to illicit trade of insigniﬁ cant volume. This is 
an effect of a consistent implementation of the provisions of the Convention 
and of the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines declared by most 
states which are outside the Convention, including the biggest manufacturers 
of this weapon. Of all the states parties to the Convention, 138 do not have 
mines stockpiled, either because they destroyed them (74) or because they never 
possessed them in the ﬁ rst place. To date, states parties have destroyed almost 
40 million anti-personnel mines from stockpiles and will destroy 16 million 
more by 2010, in accordance with their commitments under the Convention. 
Finally, the systematic removal of anti-personnel mines from the areas under 
the jurisdiction or control of states parties and states not parties29 is continuing, 
and is followed by an appropriate input of funds donated for that purpose. 
29 For example see the statement by the People’s Republic of China at the Seventh Meeting 
of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention on 18 September 2006. 
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 It is also to be noted that almost all states of the world, in one way or another, 
agreed on the need to achieve the absolute ban on anti-personnel mines, if not 
instantaneously then eventually. This is supported e.g. by the ﬁ nal declarations 
of the Second Review Conference of states parties on conventional weapons30, a 
number of resolutions of the UN General Assembly, a number of resolutions of 
individual important regional organizations, and a number of unilateral declara-
tions by individual states31 in support of the total ban or at least humanitarian 
framework of the Convention, as well as its purpose and goal. The number of 
states voting for the resolution of the UN General Assembly concerning the 
implementation of the Convention in early December last year was the biggest 
(158) since the introduction of the Convention in 1997, whereas the number 
of abstaining states was the smallest (17). In addition, 18 states not parties to 
the Convention voted for the resolution, including China.32
 Bearing in mind all these facts, it is perhaps not presumptuous to claim 
that in the not so distant future it is possible to expect the humanitarian norm 
established by the Ottawa Convention to become a rule of international cu-
stomary law, and thus binding on all the states of the world. 
30 CCW/CONF.1/WP.1/Rev.1.
31 For example see the statement by Armenia at the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties 
to the Mine Ban Convention on 18 September 2006. 
32 The Resolution of the General Assembley of the UN 60/80 was adopted on 8 December 
2005 with 158 votes in favor, 17 abstained, and no vote against.
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Saæetak
Toma Galli *
UNIVERZALIZACIJA KONVENCIJE ZA ZABRANU 
PROTUPJE©A»KIH MINA: TEMELJI, TRENUTNO 
STANJE I BUDU∆NOST
Temeljni cilj ovog rada jest utvrditi pravne temelje, opisati trenutno stanje te pokuπati 
odrediti buduÊnost univerzalizacije Konvencije za zabranu uporabe, stvaranja zaliha, 
proizvodnje i prijenosa protupjeπaËkih mina i o njihovu uniπtenju. U tu svrhu, prije 
svega smo nastojali kratko razjasniti pojam univerzalizacije meunarodnog ugovora 
opÊenito te opisati moguÊe (osnovne) naËine njezina provoenja. Pritom smo nastojali 
razjasniti odnos izmeu meunarodnog ugovornog i meunarodnog obiËajnog prava, s 
posebnim osvrtom na moguÊnosti univerzalizacije Otavske konvencije, ali jednako tako 
i raspraviti pojedine konstatacije iz zavrπnih dokumenata sastanaka dræava stranaka 
koje, u odreenoj mjeri, otvaraju ovo pitanje.  
Slijedi kratak podsjetnik na nastanak ideje sveobuhvatne i potpune zabrane protu-
pjeπaËkih mina te njezin razvoj od poËetaka devedesetih godina proπlog stoljeÊa do 
usvajanja Konvencije za zabranu protupjeπaËkih mina. Nakon toga, kroz analizu teksta 
Konvencije, zavrπnih dokumenata godiπnjih sastanaka dræava stranaka i, posebice, 
zavrπnog dokumenta Prve pregledne konferencije, nastojali smo odrediti pravnu osnovu 
i puno znaËenje pojma univerzalizacije Otavske konvencije. U odjeljku pod nazivom: 
Vremensko i prostorno πirenje Konvencije za zabranu protupjeπaËkih mina, prikazali 
smo stupanje Konvencije na snagu te njezino munjevito vremensko i prostorno πirenje, 
gotovo bez presedana u povijesti meunarodnih ugovora. 
Naposljetku, u zavrπnim poglavljima, namjera nam je bila dati prikaz postojeÊih 
metoda na raspolaganju dræavama strankama, mjerodavnim organizacijama i NGO-ima 
za daljnju univerzalizaciju tog iznimno zanimljivog i, po mnogo Ëemu, posebnog meu-
narodnog ugovora te ukratko, iz poduzetih akcija dræava stranaka i odgovarajuÊih 
reakcija dræava izvan Konvencije, pokuπati predvidjeti daljnji tijek i konaËnu sudbinu 
univerzalizacije Konvencije za zabranu protupjeπaËkih mina. 
KljuËne rijeËi: Konvencija za zabranu protupjeπaËkih mina (Otavska konvencija), uni-
verzalizacija, protupjeπaËke mine, meunarodno obiËajno i ugovorno pravo, Meunarodna 
kampanja za zabranu protupjeπaËkih mina, nedræavni (vojni) Ëimbenici
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Zusammenfassung
Toma Galli **
DIE UNIVERSALISIERUNG DES ÜBEREINKOMMENS ÜBER 
DAS VERBOT VON ANTIPERSONENMINEN: GRUNDLAGEN, 
AKTUELLER STAND UND ZUKUNFT
Das Hauptziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die Rechtsgrundlagen der Universalisie-
rung des Übereinkommens über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der Herstellung 
und der Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren Vernichtung festzustellen, 
ihren aktuellen Stand zu beschreiben und ihre Zukunft einzuschätzen. Zu diesem Zweck 
wird zunächst versucht, kurz den Begriff der Universalisierung eines völkerrechtlichen 
Vertrags allgemein zu erklären und die möglichen (grundlegenden) Umsetzungsmodali-
täten zu beschreiben. Dabei wird auf das Verhältnis zwischen vertraglichem Völkerrecht 
und internationalem Gewohnheitsrecht eingegangen, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Möglichkeiten der Universalisierung des Ottawa-Übereinkommens. Ebenso werden 
einzelne Feststellungen aus den Schlussdokumenten der Konferenzen der Unterzeichner-
staaten erörtert, die diese Frage in gewisser Weise aufwerfen.
Es folgt eine kurze Rückschau auf die Entstehung der Idee eines umfassenden und 
vollständigen Verbots von Landminen sowie ihre Entwicklung vom Anfang der neunzi-
ger Jahre des vorigen Jahrhunderts bis zur Verabschiedung des Übereinkommens über 
das Verbot von Antipersonenminen. Danach wird anhand einer Analyse des Textes des 
Übereinkommens, der Schlussdokumente der Jahreskonferenzen der Mitgliedstaaten und 
insbesondere des Schlussdokumentes der Ersten Überprüfungskonferenz der Versuch unter-
nommen, die Rechtsgrundlage und die volle Bedeutung des Begriffs der Universalisierung 
des Ottawa-Übereinkommens zu bestimmen. Im Abschnitt mit der Bezeichnung “Zeitliche 
und räumliche Verbreitung des Übereinkommens über das Verbot von Antipersonenminen” 
wird sein Inkrafttreten und seine rapide zeitliche und räumliche Verbreitung dargestellt, 
die in der Geschichte der völkerrechtlichen Verträge nahezu einmalig ist.
In den abschließenden Kapiteln werden die Methoden geschildert, die den Mitglied-
staaten, maßgeblichen Organisationen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen zur Verfügung 
stehen, um dieses äußerst interessante und in vielerlei Hinsicht besondere völkerrechtliche 
Vertragswerk zu universalisieren. Im Lichte der umgesetzten Aktionen der Mitgliedstaaten 
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und der entsprechenden Reaktionen der Nichtmitgliedstaaten wird schließlich versucht, den 
weiteren Verlauf und das endgültige Schicksal der Universalisierung des Übereinkommens 
über das Verbot von Antipersonenminen vorherzusehen. 
Schlüsselwörter: Übereinkommen über das Verbot von Antipersonenminen (Ottawa-
Übereinkommen), Universalisierung, Antipersonenminen; internationales Gewohnheits-
recht und Völkerrecht, internationale Kampagne für das Verbot von Landminen, 
nichtstaatliche (militärische) Faktoren
